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F. A. Hay ek has prov ided one of the clearest and most powerful formulations of the ideal of the rule of law: 'stripped of all technicalities this means that gov ernment in all its actions is bound by rules fix ed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coerciv e powers in giv en circumstances, and to plan one's indiv idual affairs on the basis of this knowledge'. 1 At the same time the way he draws certain conclusions from this ideal illustrates one of the two main fallacies in the contemporary treatment of the doctrine of the rule of law: the assumption of its ov erriding importance. My purpose is to analy se the ideal of the rule of law in the spirit of Hay ek's quoted statement of it and to show why some of the conclusions which he drew from it cannot be thus supported. But first we must be put on our guard against the other common fallacy concerning the rule of law.
Not uncommonly when a political ideal captures the imagination of large numbers of people its name becomes a slogan used by supporters of ideals which bear little or no relation to the one it originally designated. The fate of 'democracy ' not long ago and of 'priv acy ' today are just two ex amples of this familiar process. In 1 959 the International Congress of Jurists meeting in New Delhi gav e official blessing to a similar perv ersion of the doctrine of the rule of law.
The function of the legislature in a free society under the Rule of Law is to create and maintain the conditions which will uphold the dignity of man as an indiv idual. This dignity requires not only the recognition of his civ il and political rights but also the establishment of the social, (p.211) economic, educational and cultural conditions which are essential to the full dev elopment of his personality . 2 The report goes on to mention or refer to just about ev ery political ideal which has found support in any part of the globe during the post-war y ears.
If the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to ex plain its nature is to propound a complete social philosophy . But if so the term lacks any useful function. We hav e no need to be conv erted to the rule of law just in order to discov er that to believ e in it is to believ e that good should triumph. The rule of law is a political ideal which a legal sy stem may lack or may possess to a greater or lesser degree. That much is common ground. It is also to be insisted that the rule of law is just one of the v irtues which a legal sy stem may possess and by which it is to be judged. It is not to be confused with democracy , justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man. A non-democratic legal sy stem, based on the denial of human rights, on ex tensiv e pov erty , on racial segregation, sex ual inequalities, and religious persecution may , in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal sy stems of the more enlightened Western democracies. This does not mean that it will be better than those Western democracies. It will be an immeasurably worse legal sy stem, but it will ex cel in one respect: in its conformity to the rule of law.
Giv en the promiscuous use made in recent y ears of the ex pression 'the rule of law' it is hardly surprising that my claim will alarm many . We hav e reached the stage in which no purist can claim that truth is on his side and blame the others for distorting the notion of the rule of law. All that I can claim for my account is, first, that it presents a coherent v iew of one important v irtue which legal sy stems should possess and, secondly , that it is not original, that I am following in the footsteps of Hay ek and of many others who understood 'the rule of law' in similar way s.
(p.212) 1. The Basic Idea 'The rule of law' means literally what it say s: the rule of the law. Taken in its broadest sense this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by it. 3 But in political and legal theory it has come to be read in a narrower sense, that the gov ernment shall be ruled by the law and subject to it. The ideal of the rule of law in this sense is often ex pressed by the phrase 'gov ernment by law and not by men'. No sooner does one use these formulas than their obscurity becomes ev ident. Surely gov ernment must be both by law and by men. It is said that the rule of law means that all gov ernment action must hav e foundation in law, must be authorized by law. But is not that a tautology ? Actions not authorized by law cannot be the actions of the gov ernment as a gov ernment. They would be without legal effect and often unlawful.
It is true that we can elaborate a political notion of gov ernment which is different from the legal one: gov ernment as the location of real power in the society . It is in this sense that one can say that Britain is gov erned by The City or by the trade unions. In this sense of 'gov ernment' it is not a tautology to say that gov ernment should be based on law. If the trade union ruling a country breaks an industrial relations law in order to impose its will on the Parliament or if the President or the F.B.I. authorize burglaries and conspire to perv ert justice they can be said to v iolate the rule of law. But here 'the rule of law' is used in its original sense of obedience to law. Powerful people and people in gov ernment, just like any body else, should obey the law. This is no doubt correct, and y et does it ex haust the meaning of the rule of law? There is more to the rule of law than the law and order interpretation allows. It means more ev en than law and order applied to the gov ernment. I shall proceed on the assumption that we are concerned with gov ernment in the legal sense and with the conception of the rule of law which applies to gov ernment and to law and is no mere application of the law and order conception.
The problem is that now we are back with our initial puzzle. If gov ernment is, by definition, gov ernment authorized by law (p.213) the rule of law seems to amount to an empty tautology , not a political ideal.
The solution to this riddle is in the difference between the professional and the lay sense of 'law'. For the lawy er any thing is the law if it meets the conditions of v alidity laid down in the sy stem's rules of recognition or in other rules of the sy stem. 4 This includes the constitution, parliamentary legislation, ministerial regulations, policemen's orders, the regulations of limited companies, conditions imposed in trading licences, etc. To the lay man the law cŏnsists only of a subclass of these. To him the law is essentially a set of open, general, and relativ ely stable laws. Gov ernment by law and not by men is not a tautology if 'law' means general, open, and relativ ely stable law. In fact, the danger of this interpretation is that the rule of law might set too strict a requirement, one which no legal sy stem can meet and which embodies v ery little v irtue. It is humanly inconceiv able that law can consist only of general rules and it is v ery undesirable that it should. Just as we need gov ernment both by laws and by men, so we need both general and particular laws to carry out the jobs for which we need the law.
The doctrine of the rule of law does not deny that ev ery legal sy stem should consist of both general, open, and stable rules (the popular conception of law) and particular laws (legal orders), an essential tool in the hands of the ex ecutiv e and the judiciary alike. This principle shows how the slogan of the rule of law and not of men can be read as a meaningful political ideal. The principle does not, howev er, ex haust the meaning of 'the rule of law' and does not by itself illuminate the reasons for its alleged importance. Let us, therefore, return to the literal sense of 'the rule of law'. It has two aspects: (1 ) that people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and (2) that the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it. As was noted abov e, it is with the second aspect that we are concerned: the law must be capable of being obey ed. A person conforms with (p.214) the law to the ex tent that he does not break the law. But he obey s the law only if part of his reason for conforming is his knowledge of the law. Therefore, if the law is to be obey ed it must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out what it is and act on it. This is the basic intuition from which the doctrine of the rule of law deriv es: the law must be capable of guiding the behav iour of its subjects. It is ev ident that this conception of the rule of law is a formal one. It say s nothing about how the law is to be made: by ty rants, democratic majorities, or any other way . It say s nothing about fundamental rights, about equality , or justice. It may ev en be thought that this v ersion of the doctrine is formal to the ex tent that it is almost dev oid of content. This is far from the truth. Most of the requirements which were associated with the rule of law before it came to signify all the v irtues of the state can be deriv ed from this one basic idea.
Some Principles
Many of the principles which can be deriv ed from the basic idea of the rule of law depend for their v alidity or importance on the particular circumstances of different societies. There is little point in try ing to enumerate them all, but some of the more important ones might be mentioned:
(1 ) All law s should be prospective, open, and clear. One cannot be guided by a retroactiv e law. It does not ex ist at the time of action. Sometimes it is then known for certain that a retroactiv e law will be enacted. When this happens retroactiv ity does not conflict with the rule of law (though it may be objected to on other grounds). The law must be open and adequately publicized. If it is to guide people they must be able to find out what it is. For the same reason its meaning must be clear. An ambiguous, v ague, obscure, or imprecise law is likely to mislead or confuse at least some of those who desire to be guided by it.
(2) Law s should be relatively stable. They should not be changed too often. If they are frequently changed people will find it difficult to find out what the law is at any giv en moment and will be constantly in fear that the law has been changed since they last learnt what it was. But more important still is the fact that people need to know the law not only for short-term decisions (p.215) (where to park one's car, how much alcohol is allowed duty free, etc.) but also for long-term planning. Knowledge of at least the general outlines and sometimes ev en of details of tax law and company law are often important for business plans which will bear fruit only y ears later. Stability is essential if people are to be guided by law in their long-term decisions. 5 Three important points are illustrated by this principle. First, conformity to the rule of law is often a matter of degree, not only when the conformity of the legal sy stem as a whole is at stake, but also with respect to single laws. A law is either retroactiv e or not, but it can be more or less clear, more or less stable, etc. It should be remembered, howev er, that by asserting that conformity to the principles is a matter of degree, it is not meant that the degree of conformity can be quantitativ ely measured by counting the number of infringements, or some such method. Some infringements are worse than others. Some v iolate the principles in a formal way only , which does not offend against the spirit of the doctrine. Secondly , the principles of the rule of law affect primarily the content and form of the law (it should be prospectiv e, clear, etc.) but not only them. They also affect the manner of gov ernment bey ond what is or can usefully be prescribed by law. The requirement of stability cannot be usefully subject to complete legal regulation. It is largely a matter for wise gov ernmental policy . Thirdly , though the rule of law concerns primarily priv ate citizens as subject to duties and gov ernmental agencies in the ex ercise of their powers (on which more below), it is also concerned with the ex ercise of priv ate powers. Power-conferring rules are designed to guide behav iour and should conform to the doctrine of rule of law if they are to be capable of doing so effectiv ely . (3) The making of particular law s (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules. It is sometimes assumed that the requirement of generality is of the essence of the rule of law. This notion deriv es (as noted abov e) from the literal interpretation of 'the rule of law' when 'law' is read in its lay connotations as being restricted to general, stable, and open law. It is also reinforced by a belief that the rule of law (p.216) is particularly relev ant to the protection of equality and that equality is related to the generality of law. The last belief is, as has often been noted before, mistaken. Racial, religious, and all manner of discrimination are not only compatible but often institutionalized by general rules. The formal conception of the rule of law which I am defending does not object to particular legal orders as long as they are stable, clear, etc. But of course particular legal orders are mostly used by gov ernment agencies to introduce flex ibility into the law. A police constable regulating traffic, a licensing authority granting a licence under certain conditions, all these and their like are among the more ephemeral parts of the law. As such they run counter to the basic idea of the rule of law. They make it difficult for people to plan ahead on the basis of their knowledge of the law. This difficulty is ov ercome to a large ex tent if particular laws of an ephemeral status are enacted only within a framework set by general laws which are more durable and which impose limits on the unpredictability introduced by the particular orders. Two kinds of general rules create the framework for the enactment of particular laws: those which confer the necessary powers for making v alid orders and those which impose duties instructing the power-holders how to ex ercise their powers. Both hav e equal importance in creating a stable framework for the creation of particular legal orders. Clearly , similar considerations apply to general legal regulations which do not meet the requirement of stability . They too should be circumscribed to conform to a stable framework. Hence the requirement that much of the subordinate administrativ e law-making should be made to conform to detailed ground rules laid down in framework laws. It is essential, howev er, not to confuse this argument with democratic arguments for the close superv ision of popularly elected bodies ov er lawmaking by non-elected ones. These further arguments may be v alid but hav e nothing to do with the rule of law, and though sometimes they reinforce rule of law ty pe arguments, on other occasions they support different and ev en conflicting conclusions. (4) The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. It is of the essence of municipal legal sy stems that they institute judicial (p.217 ) bodies charged, among other things, with the duty of apply ing the law to cases brought before them and whose judgments and conclusions as to the legal merits of those cases are final. Since just about any matter arising under any law can be subject to a conclusiv e court judgment, it is obv ious that it is futile to guide one's action on the basis of the law if when the matter comes to adjudication the courts will not apply the law and will act for some other reasons. The point can be put ev en more strongly . Since the court's judgment establishes conclusiv ely what is the law in the case before it, the litigants can be guided by law only if the judges apply the law correctly . 6 Otherwise people will only be able to be guided by their guesses as to what the courts are likely to dobut these guesses will not be based on the law but on other considerations. The rules concerning the independence of the judiciary -the method of appointing judges, their security of tenure, the way of fix ing their salaries, and other conditions of serv ice-are designed to guarantee that they will be free from ex traneous pressures and independent of all authority sav e that of the law. They are, therefore, essential for the preserv ation of the rule of law. (5) The principles of natural justice must be observed. Open and fair hearing, absence of bias, and the like are obv iously essential for the correct application of the law and thus, through the v ery same considerations mentioned abov e, to its ability to guide action.
(6) The courts should have review pow ers over the implementation of the other principles. This includes rev iew of both subordinate and parliamentary legislation and of administrativ e action, but in itself it is a v ery limited rev iew -merely to ensure conformity to the rule of law. (7 ) The courts should be easily accessible. Giv en the central position of the courts in ensuring the rule of law (see principles 4 and 6) it is obv ious that their accessibility is of paramount importance. Long delay s, ex cessiv e costs, etc., may effectiv ely turn the most enlightened law to a dead letter and frustrate one's ability effectiv ely to guide oneself by the law. (p.218) (8) The discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be allow ed to pervert the law . Not only the courts but also the actions of the police and the prosecuting authorities can subv ert the law. The prosecution should not be allowed, for ex ample, to decide not to prosecute for commission of certain crimes, or for crimes committed by certain classes of offenders. The police should not be allowed to allocate its resources so as to av oid all effort to prev ent and detect certain crimes or prosecute certain classes of criminals.
This list is v ery incomplete. Other principles could be mentioned and those which hav e been mentioned need further elaboration and further justification (why -as required by the six th principle-should the courts and not some other body be in charge of rev iewing conformity to the rule of law? etc.). 7 My purpose in listing them was merely to illustrate the power and fruitfulness of the formal conception of the rule of law. It should, howev er, be remembered that in the final analy sis the doctrine rests on its basic idea that the law should be capable of prov iding effectiv e guidance. The principles do not stand on their own. They must be constantly interpreted in the light of the basic idea.
The eight principles listed fall into two groups. Principles 1 to 3 require that the law should conform to standards designed to enable it effectiv ely to guide action. Principles 4 to 8 are designed to ensure that the legal machinery of enforcing the law should not depriv e it of its ability to guide through distorted enforcement and that it shall be capable of superv ising conformity to the rule of law and prov ide effectiv e remedies in cases of dev iation from it. All the principles directly concern the sy stem and method of gov ernment in matters directly relev ant to the rule of law. Needless to say , many other aspects in the life of a community may , in more indirect way s, either strengthen or weaken the rule of law. A free press run by people anx ious to defend the rule of law is of great assistance in preserv ing it, just as a gagged press or one run by people wishing to undermine (p.219) the rule of law is a threat to it. But we need not be concerned here with these more indirect influences.
The Value of the Rule of Law
One of the merits of the doctrine of the rule of law I am defending is that there are so many v alues it does not serv e. Conformity to the rule of law is a v irtue, but only one of the many v irtues a legal sy stem should possess. This makes it all the more important to be clear on the v alues which the rule of law does serv e.
The rule of law is often rightly contrasted with arbitrary power. Arbitrary power is broader than the rule of law. Many forms of arbitrary rule are compatible with the rule of law. A ruler can promote general rules based on whim or self-interest, etc., without offending against the rule of law. But certainly many of the more common manifestations of arbitrary power run foul of the rule of law. A gov ernment subjected to the rule of law is prev ented from changing the law retroactiv ely or abruptly or secretly whenev er this suits its purposes. The one area where the rule of law ex cludes all forms of arbitrary power is in the law-apply ing function of the judiciary where the courts are required to be subject only to the law and to conform to fairly strict procedures. 8 No less important is the restraint imposed by the rule of law on the making of particular laws and thus on the powers of the ex ecutiv e. The arbitrary use of power for personal gain, out of v engeance or fav ouritism, is most commonly manifested in the making of particular legal orders. These possibilities are drastically restricted by close adherence to the rule of law.
'Arbitrary power' is a difficult notion. We hav e no cause to analy se it here. It seems, howev er, that an act which is the ex ercise of power is arbitrary only if it was done either with indifference as to whether it will serv e the purposes which alone can justify use of that power or with belief that it will not serv e them. The nature of the purposes alluded to v aries with the nature of the power. This condition represents 'arbitrary power' as a subjectiv e concept. It all depends on the state of mind of the men in power. As such the rule of law does not bear directly on the ex tent of arbitrary power. But around (p.220) its subjectiv e core the notion of arbitrary power has grown a hard objectiv e edge. Since it is univ ersally believ ed that it is wrong to use public powers for priv ate ends any such use is in itself an instance of arbitrary use of power. As we hav e seen the rule of law does help to curb such forms of arbitrary power.
But there are more reasons for v aluing the rule of law. We v alue the ability to choose sty les and forms of life, to fix longterm goals and effectiv ely direct one's life towards them. One's ability to do so depends on the ex istence of stable, secure frameworks for one's life and actions. The law can help to secure such fix ed points of reference in two way s: (1 ) by stabilizing social relationships which but for the law may disintegrate or dev elop in erratic and unpredictable way s; (2) by a policy of self-restraint designed to make the law itself a stable and safe basis for indiv idual planning. This last aspect is the concern of the rule of law.
This second v irtue of the rule of law is often, notably by Hay ek, identified as the protection of indiv idual freedom. This is right in the sense of freedom in which it is identified with an effectiv e ability to choose between as many options as possible. Predictability in one's env ironment does increase one's power of action. 9 If this is freedom well and good. The important thing is to remember that this sense of freedom differs from what is commonly meant by political freedom. Political freedom consists of: (1 ) the prohibition of certain forms of behav iour which interfere with personal freedom and (2) the limits imposed on the powers of public authorities in order to minimize interference with personal freedom. The criminal offences against the person are an ex ample of the first mode of protecting personal freedom, the disability of the gov ernment to restrict freedom of mov ement-an ex ample of the second. It is in connection with political freedom in this sense that constitutionally guaranteed rights are of great importance. The rule of law may be y et another mode of protecting personal freedom, But it has no bearing on the ex istence of spheres of activ ity free from (p.221) gov ernmental interference and is compatible with gross v iolations of human rights.
More important than both these considerations is the fact that observ ance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to respect human dignity . Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their future. Thus, respecting people's dignity includes respecting their autonomy , their right to control their future. A person's control ov er his life is nev er complete. It can be incomplete in any one of sev eral respects. The person may be ignorant of his options, unable to decide what to do, incapable of realizing his choices or frustrated in his attempts to do so, or he may hav e no choice at all (or at least none which is worth hav ing). All these failures can occur through natural causes or through the limitations of the person's own character and abilities. Naturally , there are many way s in which one person's action may affect the life of another. Only some such interferences will amount to an offence to the dignity or a v iolation of the autonomy of the person thus affected. Such offences can be div ided into three classes: insults, enslav ement, and manipulation. (I am using the last two terms in a somewhat special sense.) An insult offends a person's dignity if it consists of or implies a denial that he is an autonomous person or that he deserv es to be treated as one. An action enslav es another if it practically denies him all options through the manipulation of the env ironment. (Though it may be for a length of time-as in real slav ery -I mean to include here also coercing another to act in a certain way on a single occasion.) One manipulates a person by intentionally changing his tastes, his beliefs or his ability to act or decide. Manipulation-in other words-is manipulation of the person, of those factors relev ant to his autonomy which are internal to him. Enslav ement is the elimination of control by changing factors ex ternal to the person.
The law can v iolate people's dignity in many way s. Observ ing the rule of law by no means guarantees that such v iolations do not occur. But it is clear that deliberate disregard for the rule of law v iolates human dignity . It is the business of law to guide human action by affecting people's options. The law may , for ex ample, institute slav ery without v iolating the rule of law. But deliberate v iolation of the rule of law v iolates human (p.222) dignity . The v iolation of the rule of law can take two forms. It may lead to uncertainty or it may lead to frustrated and disappointed ex pectations. It leads to the first when the law does not enable people to foresee future dev elopments or to form definite ex pectations (as in cases of v agueness and most cases of wide discretion). It leads to frustrated ex pectations when the appearance of stability and certainty which encourages people to rely and plan on the basis of the ex isting law is shattered by retroactiv e law-making or by prev enting proper law-enforcement, etc. The ev ils of uncertainty are in prov iding opportunities for arbitrary power and restricting people's ability to plan for their future. The ev ils of frustrated ex pectations are greater. Quite apart from the concrete harm they cause they also offend dignity in ex pressing disrespect for people's autonomy . The law in such cases encourages autonomous action only in order to frustrate its purpose. When such frustration is the result of human action or the result of the actǐv ities of social institutions then it ex presses disrespect. Often it is analogous to entrapment: one is encouraged innocently to rely on the law and then that assurance is withdrawn and one's v ery reliance is turned into a cause of harm to one. A legal sy stem which does in general observ e the rule of law treats people as persons at least in the sense that it attempts to guide their behav iour through affecting the circumstances of their action. It thus presupposes that they are rational autonomous creatures and attempts to affect their actions and habits by affecting their deliberations.
Conformity to the rule of law is a matter of degree. Complete conformity is impossible (some v agueness is inescapable) and max imal possible conformity is on the whole undesirable (some controlled administrativ e discretion is better than none). It is generally agreed that general conformity to the rule of law is to be highly cherished. But one should not take the v alue of the rule of law on trust nor assert it blindly . Disentangling the v arious v alues serv ed by the rule of law helps to assess intelligently what is at stake in v arious possible or actual v iolations. Some cases insult human dignity , giv e free rein to arbitrary power, frustrate one's ex pectations, and undermine one's ability to plan. Others inv olv e only some of these ev ils. The ev il of different v iolations of the rule of law is not alway s the (p.223) same despite the fact that the doctrine rests on the solid core of its basic idea.
The Rule of Law and its Essence
Lon Fuller 1 0 has claimed that the principles of the rule of law which he enumerated are essential for the ex istence of law. This claim if true is crucial to our understanding not only of the rule of law but also of the relation of law and morality . I hav e been treating the rule of law as an ideal, as a standard to which the law ought to conform but which it can and sometimes does v iolate most radically and sy stematically . Fuller, while allowing that dev iations from the ideal of the rule of law can occur, denies that they can be radical or total. A legal sy stem must of necessity conform to the rule of law to a certain degree, he claims. From this claim he concludes that there is an essential link between law and morality . Law is necessarily moral, at least in some respects.
It is, of course, true that most of the principles enumerated in section 2 abov e cannot be v iolated altogether by any legal sy stem. 1 1 Legal sy stems are based on judicial institutions. There cannot be institutions of any kind unless there are general rules setting them up. A particular norm can authorize adjudication in a particular dispute, but no number of particular norms can set up an institution. Similarly retroactiv e laws can ex ist only because there are institutions enforcing them. This entails that there must be prospectiv e laws instructing those institutions to apply the retroactiv e laws if the retroactiv e laws are to be v alid. In the terminology of Η. L. A. Hart's theory one can say that at least some of the rules of recognition and of adjudication of ev ery sy stem must be general and prospectiv e. Naturally they must also be relativ ely clear if they are to make any sense at all, etc.
Clearly , the ex tent to which generality , clarity , prospectiv ity , (p.224) etc., are essential to the law is minimal and is consistent with gross v iolations of the rule of law. But are not considerations of the kind mentioned sufficient to establish that there is necessarily at least some moral v alue in ev ery legal sy stem? I think not. The rule of law is essentially a negativ e v alue. The law inev itably creates a great danger of arbitrary power-the rule of law is designed to minimize the danger created by the law itself. Similarly , the law may be unstable, obscure, retrospectiv e, etc., and thus infringe people's freedom and dignity . The rule of law is designed to prev ent this danger as well. Thus the rule of law is a negativ e v irtue in two senses: conformity to it does not cause good ex cept through av oiding ev il and the ev il which is av oided is ev il which could only hav e been caused by the law itself. It is thus somewhat analogous to honesty when this v irtue is narrowly interpreted as the av oidance of deceit. (I do not deny that honesty is normally conceiv ed more broadly to incorporate other v irtuous acts and inclinations.) The good of honesty does not include the good of communication between people, for honesty is consistent with a refusal to communicate. Its good is ex clusiv ely in the av oidance of the harm of deceit--and not deceit by others but by the honest person himself. Therefore, only a person who can deceiv e can be honest. A person who cannot communicate cannot claim any moral merit for being honest. A person who through ignorance or inability cannot kill another by poison deserv es no credit for it. Similarly , that the law cannot sanction arbitrary force or v iolations of freedom and dignity through total absence of generality , prospectiv ity , or clarity is no moral credit to the law. It only means that there are some kinds of ev il which cannot be brought about by the law. But this is no v irtue in the law just as it is no v irtue in the law that it cannot rape or murder (all it can do is sanction such actions).
Fuller's attempt to establish a necessary connection between law and morality fails. In so far as conformity to the rule of law is a moral v irtue it is an ideal which should but may fail to become a reality . There is another argument, howev er, which establishes an essential connection between the law and the rule of law, though it does not guarantee any v irtue to the law. Conformity to the rule of law is essential for securing whatev er purposes the law is designed to achiev e. This statement (p.225) should be qualified. We could div ide the purposes a law is intended to serv e into two kinds: those which are secured by conformity with the law in itself and those further consequences of conformity with the law or of knowledge of its ex istence which the law is intended to secure. 1 2 Thus a law prohibiting racial discrimination in gov ernment employ ment has as its direct purpose the establishment of racial equality in the hiring, promotion, and conditions of serv ice of gov ernment employ ees (since discriminatory -action is a breach of law). Its indirect purposes may well be to improv e race relations in the country in general, prev ent a threat of a strike by some trade unions, or halt the decline in popularity of the gov ernment.
Conformity to the rule of law does not alway s facilitate realization of the indirect purposes of the law, but it is essential to the realization of its direct purposes. These are achiev ed by conformity with the law which is secured (unless accidentally ) by people taking note of the law and guiding themselv es accordingly . Therefore, if the direct purposes of the law are not to be frustrated it must be capable of guiding human behav iour, and the more it conforms to the principles of the rule of law the better it can do so.
In section 2 we saw that conformity to the rule of law is one among many moral v irtues which the law should possess. The present consideration shows that the rule of law is not merely a moral v irtue-it is a necessary condition for the law to be serv ing directly any good purpose at all. Of course, conformity to the rule of law also enables the law to serv e bad purposes. That does not show that it is not a v irtue, just as the fact that a sharp knife can be used to harm does not show that being sharp is not a good-making characteristic for kniv es. At most it shows that from the point of v iew of the present consideration it is not a moral good. Being sharp is an inherent good-making characteristic of kniv es. A good knife is, among other things, a sharp knife. Similarly , conformity to the rule of law is an inherent v alue of laws, indeed it is their most important inherent v alue. It is of the essence of law to guide behav iour through rules and courts in charge of their application. Therefore, the rule of law is the specific ex cellence of the law. Since conformity to the rule of law is the v irtue of law in itself, law as law regardless (p.226) of the purposes it serv es, it is understandable and right that the rule of law is thought of as among the few v irtues of law which are the special responsiblity of the courts and the legal profession.
Regarding the rule of law as the inherent or specific v irtue of law is a result of an instrumental conception of law. The law is not just a fact of life. It is a form of social organization which should be used properly and for the proper ends. It is a tool in the hands of men differing from many others in being v ersatile and capable of being used for a large v ariety of proper purposes. As with some other tools, machines, and instruments a thing is not of the kind unless it has at least some ability to perform its function. A knife is not a knife unless it has some ability to cut. The law to be law must be capable of guiding behav iour, howev er inefficiently . Like other instruments, the law has a specific v irtue which is morally neutral in being neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put. It is the v irtue of efficiency ; the v irtue of the instrument as an instrument. For the law this v irtue is the rule of law. Thus the rule of law is an inherent v irtue of the law, but not a moral v irtue as such.
The special status of the rule of law does not mean that conformity with it is of no moral importance. Quite apart from the fact that conformity to the rule of law is also a moral v irtue, it is a moral requirement when necessary to enable the law to perform useful social functions; just as it may be of moral importance to produce a sharp knife when it is required for a moral purpose. In the case of the rule of law this means that it is v irtually alway s of great moral v alue.
Some Pitfalls
The undoubted v alue of conformity to the rule of law should not lead one to ex aggerate its importance. We saw how Hay ek noted correctly its relev ance for the protection of freedom. We also saw that the rule of law itself does not prov ide sufficient protection of freedom. Consider, howev er, Hay ek's position. He begins with a grand statement which inev itably leads to ex aggerated ex pectations:
The conception of freedom under the law that is the chief concern of this book rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespectiv e of their application (p.227 ) to us we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free. It is because the lawgiv er does not know the particular cases to
